## 1NC

### K

#### A spectre is haunting America—the spectre of queerness. All of the powers of straight sexuality have entered into an erotic alliance to exorcise these desires—President and Congress, Santorum and Scalia, Democrats in Kentucky and police officers in Louisiana all find a common enemy in the queer that they can kick and bash and burn and bruise as violently as they like.

#### Queers must OPENLY, in the face of all heterosexists in the world, announce their demands, their agendas, their desires, their tastes and styles, hopes and dreams. We queers should meet the absurd fantasy of straight civil society with their own revolutionary movement committed to victory by any means necessary.

#### Our demands are endless. We want everything, and that sure as hell includes the ballot. The state hasn’t done anything for queers except keep us locked in the closet. We echo the Mary Nardini gang when they write:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

“We’ve despaired that we could never be as well-dressed or cultured as the Fab Five. We found nothing in Brokeback Mountain. We’ve spent far too long shuffling through hall­ways with heads-hung-low. We don’t give a shit about marriage or the military. But oh we’ve had the hottest sex - everywhere - in all the ways we aren’t supposed to and the other boys at school definitely can’t know about it.

And when I was sixteen a would-be-bully pushed me and called me a faggot. I hit him in the mouth. The inter­course of my fist and his face was far sexier and more liber­ating than anything MTV ever offered our generation. With the pre-cum of desire on my lips I knew from then on that I was an anarchist.

In short, this world has never been enough for us. We say to it, “we want everything, mother­fucker, try to stop us!”

#### Living daily with queerness is an experience of profound ontological vulnerability—even when you come out of the closet you only do so partially, code-switching and trying to hide queerness from some and reveal it to others. Queerness is made the object of an interminable violence, trapped in a culture premised upon the systematic extermination of anyone who’s not a straight man.

#### This antagonistic and parasitic relation between the straight and the queer produce violent clashes, sexualizing and pathologizing identity—war, whiteness and imperialism intertwine with heterosexism and capitalism to make international military conflict the highest expressions of straight machismo. The straight state is outdated and tacky—their politics are stale—it’s time to ACT UP and BASH BACK. Again, we echo the Mary Nardini gang:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

See, we’ve always been the other, the alien, the criminal. The story of queers in this civilization has always been the narrative of the sexual deviant, the constitutional psychopathic inferior, the traitor, the freak, the moral imbecile. We’ve been excluded at the border, from labor, from familial ties. We’ve been forced into concentration camps, into sex slavery, into prisons. The normal, the straight, the american family has always constructed itself in opposition to the queer. Straight is not queer. White is not of color. Healthy does not have HIV. Man is not woman. The discourses of heterosexuality, whiteness and capitalism reproduce themselves into a model of power. For the rest of us, there is death. In his work, Jean Genet 1 asserts that the life of a queer, is one of exile - that all of the totality of this world is constructed to marginalize and exploit us. He posits the queer as the criminal. He glorifies homosexuality 2 and criminality as the most beautiful and lovely forms of conflict with the bourgeois world. He writes of the secret worlds of rebellion and joy inhabited by criminals and queers. Quoth Genet, “Excluded by my birth and tastes from the social order, I was not aware of its diversity. Nothing in the world was irrelevant: the stars on a general’s sleeve, the stock-market quotations, the olive harvest, the style of the judiciary, the wheat exchange, flower-beds. Nothing. This order, fearful and feared, whose details were all inter-related, had a meaning: my exile.”

#### Queerness is social death by way of sexualized alienation—the institution of the closet atomizes queers and prevents the development of a critical consciousness against heterosexism. There are no institutions of civil society to which the queer can appeal—the institutional labels enforced by the mainstream movement and codified in LGBT can’t do justice to the lived oppression of the queer. Every facet of heterosexual society is contoured to the extermination of queerness—reject their ideologies of neutrality.

#### The Mary Nardini gang writes:

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

VI

A fag is bashed because his gender presentation is far too femme.

A poor transman can’t afford his life-saving hormones.

A sex worker is murdered by their client.

A genderqueer persyn is raped because ze just needed to be “fucked straight”.

Four black lesbians are sent to prison for daring to defend themselves against a straight-male attacker.1

 Cops beat us on the streets and our bodies are being destroyed by pharmaceutical companies because we can’t give them a dime. Queers experience, directly with our bodies, the violence and domination of this world. Class, Race, Gender, Sexuality, Ability; while often these interrelated and overlapping categories of oppression are lost to abstraction, queers are forced to physically understand each. We’ve had our bodies and desires stolen from us, mutilated and sold back to us as a model of living we can never embody Foucault says that “power must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which constitute their own organization; as the processes which, through ceaseless struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens or reverses them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain or system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institutional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies.” We experience the complexity of domination and social control amplified through heterosexuality. When police kill us, we want them dead in turn. When prisons entrap our bodies and rape us because our genders aren’t similarly contained, of course we want fire to them all. When borders are erected to construct a national identity absent of people of color and queers, we see only one solution: every nation and border reduced to rubble.

#### This social death happens through operations of normalcy, predictability, heterosexuality. It cements itself through the creation of the state, embarking out into imperialism or colonialism or capitalism, racialized corporatism, fascism merging with ableism to construct the queer body against the health straight body, the operations of sexual difference coding desire onto the body as genital sex—every operation of domination and oppression are intertwined each with the others. Their plan is not removed from these histories of atrocity; the totality of social relations reveal themselves in the 1AC’s invocation of the state as an agent of change. These queers are ready to get all kinds of disrespectful: the only question is how can we break down this totality?

#### This impact is an ontological captivity that gives way to very real physical violence. The sexualization of violence transforms queer life into a life that is near-death, into a type of life vulnerable to its own extermination. From the mythic past of Sodom and Gomorrah to the sexualized and gendered program of colonization, straight society has always captured, incarcerated and obliterated queer corporality in a ritual purgation of its own sinfulness, moralizing queer extermination as a form of social “common sense” indispensable to antiqueer straight supremacy.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

 “Dirty faggot!” Or simply, “Look, a Gay!”

These words launch a bottle from a passing car window, the target my awaiting body. In other moments they articulate the sterilizing glares and violent fantasies that desire, and threaten to enact, my corporal undoing. Besieged, I feel in the fleshiness of the everyday like a kind of near life or a death- in- waiting. Catastrophically, this imminent threat constitutes for the queer that which is the sign of vitality itself. What then becomes of the possibility of queer life, if queerness is produced always and only through the negativity of forced death and at the threshold of obliteration? Or as Achille Mbembe has provocatively asked, in the making of a kind of corporality that is constituted in the social as empty of meaning beyond the anonymity of bone, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”1 In another time and place, “ ‘Dirty nigger!’ Or simply, ‘Look, a Negro!’ ” (“Sale nègre! ou simplement: Tiens, un nègre!”) opened Frantz Fanon’s chapter 5 of Black Skin, White Masks, “The Lived Experience of the Black” (“L’expérience vécue du Noir”), infamously mistranslated as “The Fact of Blackness.”2 I start with “Dirty faggot!” against a logic of flattened substitution and toward a political commitment to non- mimetic friction. After all, the racialized phenomenology of blackness under colonization that Fanon illustrates may be productive to read against and with a continuum of antiqueer violence in the United States. The scopic and the work of the visual must figure with such a reading of race, gender, and sexuality. It is argued, and rightfully so, that the instability of queerness obscures it from the epidermalization that anchors (most) bodies of color in the fields of the visual. When thinking about the difference between anti- Semitism and racism, which for Fanon was a question of the visuality of oppression, he similarly suggests, “the Jew can be unknown in his Jewishness.” 3 Here it may be useful to reread Fanon through an understanding of passing and the visual that reminds us that Jews can sometimes not be unknown in their Jewishness. Similarly I ask why antiqueer violence, more often than not, is correctly levied against queers. In other words, the productive discourse that wishes to suggest that queer bodies are no different might miss moments of signification where queer bodies do in fact signify differently. This is not to suggest that there is an always locatable, transhistorical queer body, but the fiercely flexible semiotics of queerness might help us build a way of knowing antiqueer violence that can provisionally withstand the weight of generality.4

#### Overkill is ontologically different from other types of violence: the law protects and sustains these forms of violence by treating them as criminal aberrations or as individual homophobia, failing to conceptualize the possibility that heterosexual society founds itself through a bargain bought at the price of queer life. The first question for this debate must be “what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing.” Until that question has been answered we can have no further impact calculus.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

Overkill is a term used to indicate such excessive violence that it pushes a body beyond death. Overkill is often determined by the postmortem removal of body parts, as with the partial decapitation in the case of Lauryn Paige and the dissection of Rashawn Brazell. The temporality of violence, the biological time when the heart stops pushing and pulling blood, yet the killing is not finished, suggests the aim is not simply the end of a specific life, but the ending of all queer life. This is the time of queer death, when the utility of violence gives way to the pleasure in the other’s mortality. If queers, along with others, approximate nothing, then the task of ending, of killing, that which is nothing must go beyond normative times of life and death. In other words, if Lauryn was dead after the first few stab wounds to the throat, then what do the remaining fifty wounds signify? The legal theory that is offered to nullify the practice of overkill often functions under the name of the trans- or gay- panic defense. Both of these defense strategies argue that the murderer became so enraged after the “discovery” of either genitalia or someone’s sexuality they were forced to protect themselves from the threat of queerness. Estanislao Martinez of Fresno, California, used the trans- panic defense and received a four- year prison sentence after admittedly stabbing J. Robles, a Latina transwoman, at least twenty times with a pair of scissors. Importantly, this defense is often used, as in the cases of Robles and Paige, after the murderer has engaged in some kind of sex with the victim. The logic of the trans- panic defense as an explanation for overkill, in its gory semiotics, offers us a way of understanding queers as the nothing of Mbembe’s query. Overkill names the technologies necessary to do away with that which is already gone. Queers then are the specters of life whose threat is so unimaginable that one is “forced,” not simply to murder, but to push them backward out of time, out of History, and into that which comes before.27 In thinking the overkill of Paige and Brazell, I return to Mbembe’s query, “But what does it mean to do violence to what is nothing?”28 This question in its elegant brutality repeats with each case I offer. By resituating this question in the positive, the “something” that is more often than not translated as the human is made to appear. Of interest here, the category of the human assumes generality, yet can only be activated through the specificity of historical and politically located intersections. To this end, the human, the “something” of this query, within the context of the liberal democracy, names rights- bearing subjects, or those who can stand as subjects before the law. The human, then, makes the nothing not only possible but necessary. Following this logic, the work of death, of the death that is already nothing, not quite human, binds the categorical (mis)recognition of humanity. The human, then, resides in the space of life and under the domain of rights, whereas the queer inhabits the place of compromised personhood and the zone of death. As perpetual and axiomatic threat to the human, the queer is the negated double of the subject of liberal democracy. Understanding the nothing as the unavoidable shadow of the human serves to counter the arguments that suggest overkill and antiqueer violence at large are a pathological break and that the severe nature of these killings signals something extreme. In contrast, overkill is precisely not outside of, but is that which constitutes liberal democracy as such. Overkill then is the proper expression to the riddle of the queer nothingness. Put another way, the spectacular material- semiotics of overkill should not be read as (only) individual pathology; these vicious acts must indict the very social worlds of which they are ambassadors. Overkill is what it means, what it must mean, to do violence to what is nothing.

#### The alternative is THE ABORTION OF REALITY, to sign your ballot for NONE OF THE ABOVE in an act of queer mutiny that throws into question heterosexual logics of reproduction and efficiency that would straightwash the violence done to queers by articulating it only as individual criminal acts. This social order has given nothing to queers that they couldn’t build on their own: use your ballot to embrace a queer reclamation of this and every other space.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 4-5)CJQ

Rather than rejecting, with liberal discourse, this ascription of negativity to the queer, we might, as I argue, do better to consider accepting and even embracing it. Not in the hope of forging thereby some more perfect social order-such a hope, after all, would only reproduce the constraining mandate of futurism, just as any such order would equally occasion the negativity of the queer-but rather to refuse the insistence of hope itself as affirmation, which is always affirmation of an order whose refusal will register as unthinkable, irresponsible, inhumane. And the trump card of affirmation? Always the question: If not this, what? Always the demand to translate the insistence, the pulsive force of negativity into "some determinate stance or "position" whose determination would thus negate it: always the imperative to immure it in some stable and positive form. When I argue, then, that we might do well to attempt what is surely impossible-to withdraw our allegiance, however compulsory, from a reality based on the Ponzi scheme of reproductive futurism -I do not intend to propose some "good" that will thereby be assured. To the contrary, I mean to insist that nothing, and certainly not what we call the "good," can ever have any assurance at all in the order of the Symbolic. Abjuring fidelity to a futurism that's always purchased at our expense, though bound, as Symbolic subjects consigned to figure the Symbolic's undoing, to the necessary contradiction of trying to turn its intelligibility against itself, we might rather, figuratively, cast our vote for "none of the above," for the primacy of a constant no in response to the law of the Symbolic, which would echo that law's foundational act, its self-constituting negation. The structuring optimism of politics to which the order of meaning commits us, installing as it does the perpetual hope of reaching meaning through signification, is always, I would argue, a negation of this primal, constitutive, and negative act. And the various positivities produced in its wake by the logic of political hope depend on the mathematical illusion that negated negations might somehow escape, and not redouble, such negativity. My polemic thus stakes its fortunes on a truly hopeless wager: that taking the Symbolic's negativity to the very letter of the law, that attending to the persistence of something internal to reason that reason refuses, that turning the force of queerness against all subjects, however queer, can afford an access to the jouissance that at once defines and negates us. Or better: can expose the constancy, the inescapability, of such access to jouissance in the social order itself, even if that order can access its constant access to jonissance only in the process of abjecting that constancy of access onto the queer.

#### There is no hope for the queer within the law: the law strives to attain justice by way of a violent mathematics of mimesis that can only conceive of antiqueer violence as individual behavior but never as condition of social life.

#### This reproduces a violent and exclusionary order centered around the extermination of the queer. The abortion of reality is necessarily the abortion of the law.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

Thinking violence as individual acts versus epistemic force works to support the normative and normalizing structuring of public pain. In other words, privatizing antiqueer violence is one of the ways in which the national body and its trauma are heterosexualized, or in which the relegation of antiqueer violence, not unlike violence against women, racist violence, violence against animals (none of which are mutually exclusive), casts the national stage of violence and its ways of mourning as always human, masculinist, able- bodied, white, gender- conforming, and heterosexual. For national violence to have value it must be produced through the tangled exclusion of bodies whose death is valueless. To this end, as mainstream LGBT groups clamber for dominant power through attachment of a teleological narrative of progress, they too reproduce the argument that antiqueer violence is something out of the ordinary.22 The problem of privatizing violence is not, however, simply one of the re- narration of the incidents. The law, and specifically “rights” discourse, which argues to be the safeguard of liberal democracy, is one of the other motors that works to privatize this structural violence. Rights are inscribed, at least in the symbolic, with the power to protect citizens of the nation-state from the excesses of the government and against the trespass of criminality. In paying attention to the anterior magic of the law, it is not so much, or at least not only, that some are granted rights because they are human, but that the performative granting of rights is what constitutes the promise of humanity under which some bodies are held. This is important in thinking about the murder of Brazell, and about antiqueer violence at large, because it troubles the very foundations of the notion of protection and the formative violence of the law itself. According to the juridical logic of liberal democracy, if these rights are infringed upon, the law offers remedy in the name of justice. This necessary and assumptive formal equality before the law is the precursor for a system argued to be based on justice. In other words, for the law to lay claim to something called justice, formalized equality must be a precondition. The law then is a systematic and systematizing process of substitution where the singular and the general are shuttled and replaced to inform a matrix of fictive justice. Thus for the law to uphold the fantasy of justice and disguise its punitive aspirations, antiqueer violence, like all structural violence, must be narrated as an outlaw practice and unrepresentative of culture at large. This logic then must understand acts like the murder of Brazell in the singular. Through a mathematics of mimesis the law reproduces difference as similarity. By funneling the desperate situations and multiple possibilities into a calculable trespass kneading out the contours and the excess along the way, equality appears. To acknowledge the inequality of “equality” before the law would undo the fantastical sutures that bind the U.S. legal system. In the hope of being clear, for the law to read antiqueer violence as a symptom of larger cultural forces, the punishment of the “guilty party” would only be a representation of justice. To this end, the law is made possible through the reproduction of both material and discursive formation of antiqueer, along with many other forms of violence.

### Case

#### Aff doesn’t solve – exceptionalism is entrenched in the state – arbitrary grabs for power are inevitable

Hussain ‘7 Nasser Hussain, assistant professor in the Department of Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought at Amherst College, “Beyond Norm and Exception: Guantánamo,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 33, No. 4, Summer 2007 jss

Finally, what are some of the implications of the argument that norm and exception have blurred severely and perhaps irrevocably? Let me stress that my efforts to draw attention to the ways in which an administrative legality has made the concept of a state of exception superfluous is not just theoretical disagreement or just an effort to discredit one particular paradigm. One may agree or disagree about the continuing validity of a concept, but my more immediate concern here is that the concept not overshadow or distort efforts to fashion a newer, fairer, and more just response. Consider then one such effort to fashion a new response: Bruce Ackerman’s proposals in “The Emergency Constitution.”50 Ackerman’s essay begins with the recognition that attacks on the U.S. similar to 9/11 are almost a virtual certainty and that without creative new constitutional concepts each attack will only prompt harsher political measures in a “downward cycle” (“A,” p. 1044). Dismissing the models currently provided for by war and crime, Ackerman settles on the concept of emergency and sets out to find a way to grant and yet control the use of extraordinary powers in the case of a genuine emergency. For Ackerman, it is time to try to rescue the concept of a state of exception from fascist thinkers like Schmitt, who used it as a battering ram against liberal democracy. Ackerman would confine a genuine emergency to a bounded state (tellingly, the “triggering event” in Ackerman’s proposals is left entirely uncharted, left to the hope of political wisdom). But because Ackerman neglects the more dispersed condition of emergency in contemporary conditions, his proposals hinge on the use of legislative oversight largely in the form of a “supermajoritarian escalator”: “majority support should serve to sustain emergency for a short time—two or three months. Continuation should require an escalating cascade of supermajorities: sixty percent for the next two months; seventy for the next; eighty thereafter” (“A,” p. 1047). While such a sensible and even workable proposal would go some of the way towards removing some of the current excesses of executive policy, my effort at highlighting the role of administrative agencies and regulations suggests that the effectiveness of Ackerman’s proposals would remain extremely limited. That is to say, only if we presume that a bounded state of exception rather than a more dispersed emergency regulation is currently being used would efforts to bind it further be effective. But proposals such as the supermajoritarian escalator would do very little to change the “spitting on the sidewalk” strategy endorsed by Ashcroft or the use of petty visa violations to enable large‐scale roundups and prolonged detention—as I noted earlier, what enables the indefinite detention of hundreds of people without charge is not the use of an exceptional measure but the multiple use of an everyday measure. Moreover, as I earlier noted with reference to Nonet’s work, the internal structure of a rule of law and its relation to administrative regimes, far from negating such an outcome, actually facilitates it. The current emergency response whose operations we witness daily emerges from a broader field of governmentality, and until such a modular and legalistic character is addressed any effort to design a more liberal emergency constitution will invariably miss a great many of its intended targets.

#### Ideals are entrenched – no mindset shift away from drone use

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 Sadly, there is little chance that America will temper, let alone end, her development and use of armed drones. In the last decade, America's passion for armed drones has become deeply entrenched, politically, economically, and militarily. Some Americans-their moral judgment clouded by passion- are dehumanizing others and suffering from a failure of empathy on a grand scale. When the world responds by becoming outraged, rather than listen, these Americans effectively put their hands over their moral ears and repeat, "Na na na, we can't hear you." Or, they become angry and essentially reply, "Be quiet! You are wrong to feel the way you do. Armed robots are just tools of war like any other tool, such as manned bombers or artillery. Besides, we're protecting you from the bad guys, too."

## 2NC

### K

#### QUEERS ARE TARGETTED FOR KILLING WITHIN STRAIGHT SOCIETY despite NO exceptional declaration of their inhumanity—this turns their aff. The antagonism between the straight and the queer is foundational to society and sovereign power—the sovereign calcifies social relations into a political apparatus. This apparatus is FOUNDATIONALLY violent, not merely exceptionally; the queer is vulnerable in everyday life and in every space. There is never a declaration of an exception; the queer is killed in spite of their humanity. Straight society is a warzone where queers must each and every day struggle for their own survival. The 1NC is an act of mutiny against a social order premised on our own death.

Queer Nation 1990 (Queer Nation, originally ACT UP [AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power], was a radical, militant queer liberation group. Text taken from <http://www.historyisaweapon.com/defcon1/queernation.html>, altered to resist fascist censorship).

I have friends. Some of them are straight. Year after year, I see my straight friends. I want to see them, to see how they are doing, to add newness to our long and complicated histories, to experience some continuity. Year after year I continue to realize that the facts of my life are irrelevant to them and that I am only half listened to, that I am an appendage to the doings of a greater world, a world of power and privilege, of the laws of installation, a world of exclusion. "That's not true," argue my straight friends. There is the one certainty in the politics of power: those left out of it beg for inclusion, while the insiders claim that they already are. Men do it to women, whites do it to blacks, and everyone does it to queers. The main dividing line, both conscious and unconscious, is procreation ... and that magic word --- Family. Frequently, the ones we are born into disown us when they find out who we really are, and to make matters worse, we are prevented from having our own. We are punished, insulted, cut off, and treated like seditionaries in terms of child rearing, both damned if we try and damned if we abstain. It's as if the propagation of the species is such a fragile directive that without enforcing it as if it were an agenda, humankind would melt back into the primeval ooze. I hate having to convice straight people that lesbians and gays live in a war zone, that we're surrounded by bomb blasts only we seem to hear, that our bodies and souls are heaped high, dead from fright or bashed or raped, dying of grief or disease, stripped of our personhood. I hate straight people who can't listen to queer anger without saying "hey, all straight people aren't like that. I'm straight too, you know," as if their egos don't get enough stroking or protection in this arrogant, heterosexist world. Why must we take care of them, in the midst of our just anger brought on by their fucked up society?! Why add the reassurance of "Of course, I don't mean you. You don't act that way." Let them figure out for themselves whether they deserve to be included in our anger. But of course that would mean listening to our anger, which they almost never do. They deflect it, by saying "I'm not like that" or "Now look who's generalizing" or "You'll catch more flies with honey ... " or "If you focus on the negative you just give out more power" or "you're not the only one in the world who's suffering." They say "Don't yell at me, I'm on your side" or "I think you're overreacting" or "BOY, YOU'RE BITTER." They've taught us that good queers don't get mad. They've taught us so well that we not only hide our anger from them, we hide it from each other. WE EVEN HIDE IT FROM OURSELVES. We hide it with substance abuse and suicide and overarhcieving in the hope of proving our worth. They bash us and stab us and shoot us and bomb us in ever increasing numbers and still we freak out when angry queers carry banners or signs that say BASH BACK. For the last decade they let us die in droves and still we thank President Bush for planting a fucking tree, applaud him for likening PWAs to car accident victims who refuse to wear seatbelts. LET YOURSELF BE ANGRY. Let yourself be angry that the price of our visibility is the constant threat of violence, anti- queer violence to which practically every segment of this society contributes. Let yourself feel angry that THERE IS NO PLACE IN THIS COUNTRY WHERE WE ARE SAFE, no place where we are not targeted for hatred and attack, the self-hatred, the suicide --- of the closet. The next time some straight person comes down on you for being angry, tell them that until things change, you don't need any more evidence that the world turns at your expense. You don't need to see only hetero couple grocery shopping on your TV ... You don't want any more baby pictures shoved in your face until you can have or keep your own. No more weddings, showers, anniversaries, please, unless they are our own brothers and sisters celebrating. And tell them not to dismiss you by saying "You have rights," "You have privileges," "You're overreacting," or "You have a victim's mentality." Tell them "GO AWAY FROM ME, until YOU can change." Go away and try on a world without the brave, strong queers that are its backbone, that are its guts and brains and souls. Go tell them go away until they have spent a month walking hand in hand in public with someone of the same sex. After they survive that, then you'll hear what they have to say about queer anger. Otherwise, tell them to shut up and listen.

#### This means that they are WRONG about the nature of violence. heterosexuals are empowered to HATE US and to hate us PUBLICLY. There is no anomie in the law that would make the queers vulnerable: we are already vulnerable before we even enter into a relationship with the state.

Stanley 2011 (Eric, “Near Life, Queer Death Overkill and Ontological Capture,” Social Text 107 s Vol. 29, No. 2 s Summer 2011)CJQ

If for Agamben bare life expresses a kind of stripped- down sociality or a liminal space at the cusp of death, then near life names the figuration and feeling of nonexistence, as Fanon suggests, which comes before the question of life might be posed. Near life is a kind of ontocorporal (non) sociality that necessarily throws into crisis the category of life by orientation and iteration. This might better comprehend not only the incomprehensible murders of Brazell, Paige, and Weaver, but also the terror of the dark cell inhabited by the queer survivor of the Holocaust who perished under “liberation.”33 Struggling with the phenomenology of black life under colonization, Fanon opens up critical ground for understanding a kind of near life that is made through violence to exist as nonexistence. For Fanon, violence is bound to the question of recognition (which is also the im/possibility of subjectivity) that apprehends the relationship between relentless structural violence and instances of personal attacks evidenced by the traumatic afterlives left in their wake. For Fanon, the Hegelian master/slave dialectic, as theoretical instrument for thinking about recognition, must be reconsidered through the experience of blackness in the French colonies. For Fanon, Hegel positions the terms of the dialectic (master/slave) outside history and thus does not account for the work of the psyche and the historicity of domination like racialized colonization and the epidermalization of that power. In other words, for Fanon, when the encounter is staged and the drama of negation unfolds, Hegel assumes a pure battle. Moreover, by understanding the dialectic singularly through the question of self- consciousness, Hegel, for Fanon, misrecognizes the battle as always and only for recognition. Informed by Alexandre Kojève and Jean- Paul Sartre, Fanon makes visible the absent figure of Enlightenment assumed by the Hegelian dialectic. For Fanon, colonization is not a system of recognition but a state of raw force and total war. The dialect cannot in the instance of colonization swing forward and offer the self- consciousness of its promise. According to Fanon, “For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the slave. What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work.”34 Hegel’s dialectic that, through labor, offers the possibility of self- consciousness, for the colonized is frozen in a state of domination and nonreciprocity.35 What is at stake for Fanon, which is also why this articulation is helpful for thinking near life, is not only the bodily terror of force; ontological sovereignty also falls into peril under foundational violence. This state of total war, not unlike the attacks that left Brazell, Paige, and Weaver dead, is at once from without — the everyday cultural, legal, economic practices — and at the same time from within, by a consciousness that itself has been occupied by domination. For Fanon, the white imago holds captive the ontology of the colonized. The self/Other apparatus is dismantled, thus leaving the colonized as an “object in the midst of other objects,” embodied as a “feeling of nonexistence.”36 While thinking alongside Fanon on the question of racialized difference, violence, and ontology, how might we comprehend a phenomenology of antiqueer violence expressed as “nonexistence”? It is not that we can take the specific structuring of blackness in the French colonies and assume it would function the same today, under U.S. regimes of antiqueer violence. However, if both desire and antiqueer violence are embrocated by the histories of colonization, then such a reading might help to make more capacious our understanding of antiqueer violence today as well as afford a rereading of sexuality in Fanon’s texts. Indeed, Fanon’s intervention offers a space of nonexistence, neither master nor slave, written through the vicious work of epistemic force imprisoned in the cold cell of ontological capture. This space of nonexistence, or near life, forged in the territory of inescapable violence, allows us to understand the murders of queers against the logics of aberration. This structure of antiqueer violence as irreducible antagonism crystallizes the ontocorporal, discursive, and material inscriptions that render specific bodies in specific times as the place of the nothing. The figuration of near life should be understood not as the antihuman but as that which emerges in the place of the question of humanity. In other words, this is not simply an oppositional category equally embodied by anyone or anything. This line of limitless inhabitation, phantasmatically understood outside the intersections of power, often articulated as “equality,” leads us back toward rights discourse that seeks to further extend (momentarily) the badge of personhood. The nothing, or those made to live the death of a near life, is a break whose structure is produced by, and not remedied through, legal intervention or state mobilizations. For those who are overkilled yet not quite alive, what form might redress take, if any at all?

#### Their optimism is misplaced—society has been totalized against the queer since the inception of straight society. They don’t have a coherent narrative of how queers can effectuate change.

Sedgwick 1990 (Eve Karofsky, the queer queen, “Epistemology of the Closet,” Pp. 128-129)CJQ

From at least the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah, scenarios of same-sex desire would seem to have had a privileged, though by no means an exclusive, relation in Western culture to scenarios of both genocide and omnicide. That sodomy, the name by which homosexual acts are known even today to the law of half of the United States and to the Supreme Court of all of them, should already be inscribed with the name of a site of mass extermination is the appropriate trace of a double history. In the first place there is a history of the mortal suppression, legal or subjudicial, of gay acts and gay people, through burning, hounding, physical and chemical castration, concentration camps, bashing, the array of sanctioned fatalities that Louis Crompton records under the name of gay genocide, and whose supposed eugenic motive becomes only the more colorable with the emergence of a distinct, naturalized minority identity in the nineteenth century. In the second place, though, there is the inveterate topos of associating gay acts or persons with fatalities vastly broader than their own extent: if it is ambiguous whether every denizen of the obliterated Sodom was a sodomite, clearly not every Roman of the late Empire can have been so, despite Gibbon's connecting the eclipse of the whole people to the habits of a few. Following both Gibbon and the Bible, moreover, with an impetus borrowed from Darwin, one of the few areas of agreement among modern Marxist, Nazi, and liberal capitalist ideologies is that there is a peculiarly close, though never precisely defined, affinity between same-sex desire and some historical condition of moribundity, called "decadence," to which not individuals or minorities but whole civilizations are subject. Bloodletting on a scale more massive by orders of magnitude than any gay minority presence in the culture is the "cure," if cure there be, to the mortal illness of decadence. If a fantasy trajectory, utopian in its own terms, toward gay genocide has been endemic in Western culture from its origins, then, it may also have been true that the trajectory toward gay genocide was never clearly distinguishable from a broader, apocalyptic trajectory toward something approaching omnicide.

#### Antiqueerness is the root cause of American exceptionalism—Uncle Sam is a heteropatriarchal and pre-conscoius drive, commanding a violence male body to conquer the world. Their affirmative fails to account for irrational desires to kill, ensuring continued exceptionalism.

Hope 1994 (Trevor, PhD Comp. Lit at Cornell, “Melancholic Modernity: The Hom(m)osexual Symptom and the Homosocial Corpse,” in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies, Volume 6, Numbers 2+3 PP 174-198)CJQ

The fetishistic operations of the epistemology of the closet - an epistemology which maintains this sentence at the heart of all social relations- make all gestures of referentiality, even those that would propose a "symptomatic" critique of homophobia, ultimately ambivalent. This is true of the recent debates in lesbian, bisexual, and gay politics about the strategy of "outing" public figures who have, either actively or through lindifference, persecuted lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men and courted heterosexual privilege and homophobic approval. The problem with such a strategy is that it implies, once again, that ultimately the responsibility for the closet- indeed the pathological core of homophobia, its symptomaticity - is to be detected within the psyches of lesbians, bisexuals, and gay men themselves, rather than in the structure of power relations that insistently maintain homosexuality within the structure of the "open secret." We might begin to unpack the dense relationship among male homosexuality, homophobia, the death drive, and the melancholic constitution of modernity in relation to the celebrated, incorporated paternal corpse by looking at one point where MacCannell's text attempts to hermeneutically uncover the insidious desire of the modernity which strives to conceal its aim. Her interpretive gesture insistently sutures the melancholic nature of this desire around the figure of male homosexuality: [While it is easier to picture the collective body as iconically a him or her, the thought is deeply repugnant to modern social forms. We find gender designations strangely inappropriate to the modern democratic collective. Mother countries and fatherlands are associated with radical political variants, and the great emblem of democracy, the United States, has settled on the "primitive " solution, the figure of the mother's brother, Uncle Sam, who can fill in for a parent without needing to be one. It is even more impolite to ask what It wants, to suggest that It desires. (10) In accordance with the etiquette of modern desire, then, MacCannell here politely confines her moment of hermeneutic re-covery to a footnote: In wartime, of course, Uncle Sam wants soldier males: his concrete response appears in First World War recruiting posters where his finger points directly at the viewer and the legend reads, "Uncle Sam wants You!" (184n3) This, then, should we be impolite enough to ask, is the bedrock of the injunction to "Enjoy!" We might, of course, see the very gesture of ostentation in this narrative as simultaneously a categorical imperative and a moment of interpellation, a subjectivation through desire. Thus, running beneath the neutrality of the collective and binding It that grounds sociality lies the suspicion (for we are dealing, here, with a hermeneutics of suspicion, a footnote hermeneutics, an obscure and agonistic epistemological re-covery whose relationship to the referential melancholies of Cartesian doubt we would do well to bear in mind) of a lingering pathology, a perversion: male homosexuality. Beneath the polite veneer of the fraternal regime, if one is indelicate enough to pursue the point, there lies an obscene homosexual desire. The corpus socians finally coheres, in wartime, in extremis (and the generalization of war, of death, is, of course, the very heart of liberal democracy's pursuit of life, liberty, and happiness) around the exquisite, because exquisitely mortal, tragically youthful corporeality of the soldier male. The American citizen is thus interpellated not only according to a gendered circuit of desire, but according to the deathly erotics of male homosexuality. "You!" (regardless of sex or, rather, through the active denial of sexual difference) are bound to the sociality of nationhood through the entrapping desire of a kinky Uncle. Furthermore, his accusatory finger and beady gaze ensure that You! are not unaware of the compulsory nature of Uncle Sam's wants: his desire holds You! and penetrates You! You! are petrified in that supervisory stare. Indeed, that petrification is your substance, your ontology, the self-consciousness of guilt your only consciousness. If You! enjoy citizenship and its attendant rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, it is precisely only insofar as You! in your petrification- your symptomaticity- have embodied, incorporated, encrypted, that fraternal Gestalt caught in the jouissance of deathly combat. It is, indeed, at the price of this morbid substitutability, this constant proximity to, embodiment of, death, that your life is purchased. The enjoyment of the soldier male's exquisite body is the enjoyment at the heart of the modern socius, but in its very onto-logic it is an enjoyment in the grip of- or at the end of the finger of- death: melancholic, masochistic, paranoid, constructed and de-structed in the shadow of the phantasm of annihilation, apprehending itself tragically, cathecting itself hypochondriacally, "desisting" at the point of the melancholic loss that is its kernel, enjoying and purchasing its "presence" only in (the anticipation of) its archaic grounding in loss: pre-siding only in the certainty that it has always already fallen, enjoying its liberty only in the knowledge of the judgment of guilt that hovers over it, desiring, at the end offinger, only where a policing gaze has already entrapped it.

#### Queer optimism underestimates the gratuitous violence of heterosexist domination—the only political thought we’re permitted to think are ones that are useful to straight people, and anyone who thinks otherwise is branded as a bad queer or a sassy queen. They’re just wrong on this question—the queer is socially dead.

Edelman 2004 (Lee, Prof. English at Tufts, “No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive,” Pp. 134-135)CJQ

For the politics of reproductive futurism, the only politics we're permitted to know, organizes and administers an apparently self-regulating economy of sentimentality in which futurity comes to signify access to the realization of meaning both promised and prohibited by the fact of our formation as subjects of the signifier. As a figure for the supplementarity, the logic of restitution or compensation, that sustains our investment in the deferrals demanded by the signifying chain, the future holds out the hope of a final undoing of the initiating fracture, the constitutive moment of division, by means of which the signifier is able to pronounce us into subjectivity. And it offers that hope by mobilizing a fantasy of temporal reversal, as if the future were pledged to make good the loss it can only ever repeat. Taking our cue from de Man's account of Walter Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator," we might note that the future can engage temporality only in the mode of figuration because futurity stands in the place of a linguistic, rather than a temporal, destiny: "The dimension of futurity," according to de Man, "is not temporal but is the correlative of the figural pattern and the disjunctive power which Benjamin locates in the structure of language." That structure, as de Man interprets it, requires the perpetual motion of what he calls "a wandering, an errance," and "this motion, this errancy of language which never reaches the mark," is nothing else, for Benjamin, than history itself, generating, in the words of de Man, "this illusion of a life that is only an afterlife." 27 Confusing linguistic with phenomenal reality, that illusion, which calls forth history from the gap of the "disjunctive power" internal to the very "structure of language," names the fantasy of a social reality to which reproductive futurism pledges us all. It is just such a violent reduction of reality to the status of an illusion, the result of approaching history, with de Man, as a rhetoric or poetics rather than as the ongoing dialectic of meaning's eventual realization through time, that is brought to bear on Bodega Bay in the figure of the birds. Not that I wish to define them as merely the sliding of the signifier, as if, become truly incapable now of distinguishing a hawk from a handsaw, Hamlet replied to Polonius, when asked what he's reading, "Birds, birds, birds." But I do want to argue that Hitchcock's birds, in the specificity of their embodiment, resist, both within and without the film, hermeneutic determination-and they do so by carrying, in the figural atmosphere through which they wing their way, the force of a poetics never fully contained by a hermeneutic claim, where "poetics," as the term is used by de Man, identifies a "formal procedure considered independently of its semantic function." 28 Expressing this surplus of "formal procedure" that inhabits and exceeds (and so threatens to confound) the imperative to generate meaning, the birds may persistently beat against, but are destined nonetheless to fly through and not from, the medium of meaning in which they come only to mean its degeneration. Though our faith in social reality makes that reality seem as natural as the very air we breathe, the radical excess that the birds connote, like the constant iteration and accumulation of hetero-sexualizing narratives - social and political narratives no less than literary or aesthetic ones - bespeaks a drive that eludes all efforts to formulate its meaning.29

#### We have a new set of axioms for politics, the most important of which is this: PEOPLE ARE DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER. They homogenize oppression when they isolate exceptionalism as the root cause. Their arguments are ahistorical in face of antiqueer violence.

Sedgwick 1990 (Eve Karofsky, the queer queen, “Epistemology of the Closet,” Pp. 22-24)CJQ

Axiom 1: People are different from each other. It is astonishing how few respectable conceptual tools we have for dealing with this self-evident fact. A tiny number of inconceivably coarse axes of categorization have been painstakingly inscribed in current critica1 and political thought: gender, race, class, nationality, sexual orientation are pretty much the available distinctions. They, with the associated demonstrations of the mechanisms by which they are constructed and reproduced, are indispensable, and they may indeed override all or some other forms of difference and similarity. But the sister or brother, the best friend, the classmate, the parent, the child, the lover, the ex-: our families, loves, and enmities alike, not to mention the strange relations of our work, play, and activism, prove that even people who share all or most of our own positionings along these crude axes may still be different from us, and from each other, to seem like all but different species. Everybody has learned this, I assume, and probably everybody who survives at all has reasonably rich, unsystematic resources of nonce taxonomy for mapping out the possibilities, dangers, and stimulations of their human social landscape. It is probably people with the experience of oppression or subordination who have most need to know it; and I take the precious, devalued arts of gossip, immemorially associated in European thought with servants, with effeminate and gay men, with all women, to have to do not even so much with the transmission of necessary news as with the refinement of necessary skills for making, testing, and using un-rationalized and provisional hypotheses about what kinds of people there are to be found in one's world.25 The writing of a Proust or a James would be exemplary here: projects precisely of nonce taxonomy, of the making and unmaking and remaking and re-dissolution of hundreds of old and new categorical imaginings concerning all the kinds it may take to make up a world. I don't assume that all gay men or all women are very skilled at the nonce-taxonomic work represented by gossip, but it does make sense to suppose that our distinctive needs are peculiarly disserved by its devaluation. For some people, the sustained, foregrounded pressure of loss in the AIDS years may be making such needs clearer: as one anticipates or tries to deal with the absence of people one loves, it seems absurdly impoverishing to surrender to theoretical trivialization or to "the sentimental" one's descriptive requirements that the piercing bouquet of a given friend's particularity be done some justice. What is more dramatic is that-in spite of every promise to the centrally - every single theoretically or politically interesting project of postwar thought has finally had the effect of de-legitimating our space for asking or thinking in detail about the multiple, unstable ways in which people may be like or different from each other.

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#### the perm is the str8 acting queer, you misplace your hope which allows civil society to reproduce violence. any futurist politic investing hope in the future dooms the perm and proves exclusivity

(Mary Nardini gang, clandestine criminal queers from Wisconsin, “Toward the Queerest Insurrection,” available at <http://zinelibrary.info/files/QueerestImposed.pdf>)

Queer is not merely another identity that can be tacked onto a list of neat social categories, nor the quantitative sum of our identities. Rather, it is the quali­tative position of opposition to presentations of stability - an identity that problematizes the manageable limits of identity. Queer is a ter­ritory of tension, defined against the domi­nant narrative of white-hetero-monogamous-patriarchy, but also by an affinity with all who are marginalized, otherized and oppressed. Queer is the abnormal, the strange, the dan­gerous. Queer involves our sexuality and our gender, but so much more. It is our desire and fantasies and more still. Queer is the cohesion of everything in conflict with the heterosexual capitalist world. Queer is a total rejection of the regime of the Normal. II As queers we understand Normalcy. Normal, is the tyranny of our condition; reproduced in all of our relationships. Normalcy is violently reiterated in every minute of every day. We understand this Normalcy as the Totality. The Totality being the interconnection and overlapping of all oppression and misery. The Totality is the state. It is capitalism. It is civilization and empire. The totality is fence-post crucifixion. It is rape and murder at the hands of police. It is “Str8 Acting” and “No Fatties or Femmes”. It is Queer Eye for the Straight Guy. It is the brutal lessons taught to those who can’t achieve Normal. It is every way we’ve limited ourselves or learned to hate our bodies. We understand Normalcy all too well. III When we speak of social war, we do so because purist class analysis is not enough for us. What does a marxist economic worldview mean to a survivor of bashing? To a sex worker? To a homeless, teenage runaway? How can class analysis, alone as paradigm for a revolution, promise liberation to those of us journeying beyond our assigned genders and sexualities? The Proletariat as revolutionary subject marginalizes all whose lives don’t fit in the model of heterosexual-worker. Lenin and Marx have never fucked the ways we have. We need something a bit more thorough - something equipped to come with teeth-gnashing to all the intricacies of our misery. Simply put, we want to make ruins of domination in all of its varied and interlacing forms. This struggle inhabiting every social relationship is what we know as social war. It is both the process and the condition of a conflict with this totality. IV In the discourse of queer, we are talking about a space of struggle against this totality - against normalcy. By “queer”, we mean “social war”. And when we speak of queer as a conflict with all domination, we mean it.

#### There’s an assimilation disad to the perm; the perm overcodes queer difference within a heterosexist order by folding queer activism within a straight frame of reference—affirming the particularity of queer positionality is a prior question.

Bersani 2010 (Leo, Prof. French at UC – Berkeley, “Is the Rectum a Grave? And other essays,” Pp. 40-41, University of Chicago Press)CJQ

The psychoanalytic inquiry can be politicized in ways generally not allowed for by queer theorists. Like Eve Sedgwick, most of these thinkers feel that accounts of the origin of sexual preference and identity in individuals run counter to politically gay- affi rmative work. The trouble is that gay affirmation has become a tame affair, which is perhaps inevitable when we are that suspicious of sexual identities. Queer rhetoric, as in Butler’s definition of lesbians as people who know how homophobia operates against women, can be deliberately inflammatory, but in rejecting the sexual specificity of queerness we have become more and more inclined to define our communitarian goals in terms provided by the homophobic community. It seems at times as if we can no longer imagine anything more politically stimulating than to struggle for acceptance as good soldiers, good priests, and good parents. While I remain enough of a liberal to believe that we should defend people’s rights to serve whatever worthy or unworthy cause inspires them, I’m more excited by some glorious precedents for thinking of homosexuality as truly disruptive—as a force not limited to the modest goal of tolerance for diverse lifestyles, but perhaps even mandating the choice of an outlaw existence. That choice (which I’ll elaborate on in a moment) would be quite different from what currently passes for queer politics. Suspicious of any enforced identity, gays and lesbians play subversively—a word I’ve come to distrust, since it doesn’t seem to mean much more than engaging in naughty parodies—with normative identities, attempting, for example, to resignify the family for communities that defy the usual assumptions about what constitutes a family. These efforts can have assimilative rather than subversive consequences; having de-gayed themselves, gays melt into the very culture they like to think of themselves as undermining. Or, having “realistically” abandoned what Steven Seidman, in his essay for Fear of a Queer Planet, calls a “millenial vision” of dominations’s demise, we resign ourselves to the micropolitics of local struggles for participatory democracy and social justice—not shying away, as Seidman puts it, “from spelling out a vision of a better society in terms resonant to policy makers and activists.” We thus reveal political ambitions about as stirring as those reflected on the bumper stickers that enjoin us to “think globally and act locally.”

#### The end result is a self-erasing politics—any risk of a link carries a potential politics of seduction, the internalization of heterosexist desire which turns all revolutionary politics against itself.

Bersani 2010 (Leo, Prof. French at UC – Berkeley, “Is the Rectum a Grave? And other essays,” Pp. 14-15, University of Chicago Press)CJQ

The dead seriousness of the gay commitment to machismo (by which I of course don’t mean that all gays share, or share unambivalently, this commitment) means that gay men run the risk of idealizing and feeling inferior to certain representations of masculinity on the basis of which they are in fact judged and condemned. The logic of homosexual desire includes the potential for a loving identification with the gay man’s enemies. And that is a fantasy- luxury that is at once inevitable and no longer permissible. Inevitable because a sexual desire for men can’t be merely a kind of culturally neutral attraction to a Platonic Idea of the male body; the object of that desire necessarily includes a socially determined and socially pervasive definition of what it means to be a man. Arguments for the social construction of gender are by now familiar. But such arguments almost invariably have, for good political reasons, quite a different slant; they are didactically intended as demonstrations that the male and female identities proposed by a patriarchal and sexist culture are not to be taken for what they are proposed to be: ahistorical, essential, biologically determined identities. Without disagreeing with this argument, I want to make a different point, a point understandably less popular with those impatient to be freed of oppressive and degrading self- defi nitions. What I’m saying is that a gay man doesn’t run the risk of loving his oppressor only in the ways in which blacks or Jews might more or less secretly collaborate with their oppressors—that is, as a consequence of the oppression, of that subtle corruption by which a slave can come to idolize power, to agree that he should be enslaved because he is enslaved, that he should be denied power because he doesn’t have any. But blacks and Jews don’t become blacks and Jews as a result of that internalization of an oppressive mentality, whereas that internalization is in part constitutive of male homosexual desire, which, like all sexual desire, combines and confuses impulses to appropriate and to identify with the object of desire.

#### Their aff is a banal repetition of the Americanized “politics of inclusion” – foreign others are conceptualized as barren subjects to be reduced to the terms of Western foreign policy as prerequisites to their inclusion

Nayar '99 Jayan, real life Transformer and above-average poet, school of law at University of Warwick, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity,” Fall 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599, lexis

The discussion in this article thus far on the technologies of ordering may be regarded by some readers as being quite irrelevant to our current concerns of addressing the ills of the world. However, I must disagree. My purpose in engaging in this discussion has been to relocate ourselves, the "critics" of world (mis)orderings within the social sphere of ordered violence. As we contemplate transformations, therefore, it is essential that we do not detach ourselves from the "worlds" which are the objects of our critique and imaginations. To some, those who might have the occasion to read this current article, the changes brought about by the advent of the so-called post-colonial, post-communist, post-ideological, post-modern period may indeed have been beneficial. Some of us--the expert intellectual community, the development planners, the security strategists, the bureaucratic elites, even the "students" who might have been encouraged to refer to the insights contained in this Symposium--are, to some extent or the other, the beneficiaries of this [\*626] order(ing). From this location, then, it becomes not too difficult to rationalize the limited successes, if not defend the fundamentals, of "our world" within a transnational, global reality. n49 It becomes not too difficult to intellectualize pleasure and pain and to project toward ever-more "new beginnings" in which the virtues of "our world" may be extolled. For this is the "truth" of the "world" as experienced within these locations of privilege. Others among us, without the comforts of such complacencies and with the best of intentions, may seek to extend and apply the benefits of the world that we know, that is "our" truth, to those who we identify as being "excluded." The politics of inclusion then dominates our attention--inclusion of the poor in "development," inclusion of the terrorized in the framework of "security," inclusion of all those thus far marginalized into the "world." n50 The keyword for this new politics of inclusion, we often hear, is "participation." So we might struggle to bring the excluded within the fora of national, international and transnational organizations, articulate their interests and demand service to their cause. And yet, so much inclusion has done little to change the culture of violence. However sympathetic, even empathetic, we may be to the cause of the "subaltern," however sophisticated and often self-complicating our exposition of violence, one thing is difficult for us to face: when all is said and done, most of us engaged in these transformatory endeavors are far removed from the existential realities of "subaltern" [\*627] suffering. For "them," what is the difference, I wonder, between the violence of new orders and that of the old, what is the difference between the new articulations of violence and those of the old, when violence itself is a continuing reality? But we push on, keeping ourselves busy. What else can we do but suggest new beginnings? I am not suggesting that all "new beginnings" of world-order, past and present, were envisioned with cynical intent. Quite the opposite is the reason for the point I wish to make. The persistent realities of violence within "ordered" worlds are all the more glaring when we acknowledge that they arise in the name of human aspirations that were mostly articulated by progressive forces, in the wake of real struggles, to contribute to the transformation of the inequities and violence of the then existing "orders." Yet more and more talk of universal human welfare, transformed world-orders, new beginnings and the like have only given us more and more occasion to lament the resulting dashed hopes. My questioning is not of intent, or of commitment, or of the sincerity of those who advocate world-order transformations. Rather, my questionings relate to a perspective on "implications." Here, there is a very different, and more subtle, sort of globalized world-order that we need to consider--the globalization of violence, wherein human relationships become disconnected from the personal and are instead conjoined into distant and distanced chains of violence, an alienation of human and human. And by the nature of this new world-ordering, as the web of implication in relational violence is increasingly extended, so too, the vision of violence itself becomes blurred and the voice, muted. Through this implication into violence, therefore, the order(ing) of emancipatory imagination is reinforced. What we cannot see, after all, we cannot speak; what we refuse to see, we dare not speak.

#### their theoretical approach to emancipation is a dull-lived view and experience of oppression - we become trapped in endless theorizing about violence which dulls us to material oppression

Nayar '99 Jayan, real life Transformer and above-average poet, school of law at University of Warwick, “SYMPOSIUM: RE-FRAMING INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: Orders of Inhumanity,” Fall 1999, 9 Transnat'l L. & Contemp. Probs. 599,lexis

You see, I do feel wonder. I wonder at the immense industry of intellectuals and at their incredible capacity for knowledge. Yet I wonder. I wonder whether for all this accumulated knowledge contained in the uniform currency of the intellectual business enterprise, any step closer is made toward the realization of a less violent reality. It is not that my wonderment and my wondering are not connected in any way. For in so much of the recent works of intellectual theorizations the grounded work of emancipatory politics is emphasized. No longer, it seems, are the promises of far-away tomorrows legitimate, the search now is for peoples everyday and localized commonsense. I wonder at the theoretical elegance of these new proposals. But something, however, does not feel quite right. Despite its many qualities something feels so totally lacking. I feel this something is touch; for all their intellectual appeal, there is no joy, nor pain, no living, which touches me in these attempts to theorize emancipation. Am I wrong to wonder in this way? Is it wrong that I wonder who it is that these "epistemic transitions"--the intellectual version of what can simply be described as a change in our understanding of the world--are said to affect? Who is the "audience" to whom this call for an emancipatory common sense is directed? The intellectual merit of what is being done cannot be faulted; intellectually, there is much to praise about the challenges that have been identified in order that a less violent reality may be worked for. But I wonder if all this is a little too convenient. I wonder if these theorizations, when the jargon and the complexities of language are removed, say much more than  [\*631]  what has already been said in so many different tongues, as the articulation of common sense. Returning to this question of a change in our understanding of the world, I wonder if here lies the issue: what change to whose understanding of the world? Why do I feel this insecurity? Why do I find myself constantly in this spiral of seeking direction, perhaps even, sometimes, solace, from the vast "treasures" of "scholarly" expositions? Is it because I am afraid to shift my eyes from the "book" to the world? Is it because I am afraid to see? I wonder if the searching for comfort in the mind relieves what is already known. When we speak of a change in our understanding of the world, this heralded "epistemic transition" that is supposed to be the hallmark of "post-modern knowledge," what we are really talking about is the way in which we who are afraid to accept our own responsibility for the many expressions of violence in the world, although we know it, seek to find a means of making sense, from a distance, of violence, of madness. By changing the way in which we understand the world intellectually therefore we postpone again that time when pain and joy are allowed to filter into our hearts in lived emancipation, with all their messy repercussions. Instead we remain largely untouched within this realm of theorized emancipation. It is not easy however to keep our distance. It requires a lot of effort in order to not see and feel. We have to keep ourselves constantly busy. This spiral of constant reinterpretations of violence through so many theories becomes almost an anaesthetic. When I plunder through my "readings," as I search for further articulations of "good ideas," with my daily musings over "theoretical frameworks," as I keep myself busy, I am diverted from asking why--what is this all for? I know that if I stop, if I have a moment or two for reflection, if I deny myself the distractions of "good ideas," that question re-emerges; in our quiet moments, if we allow ourselves quiet moments, we cannot hide from ourselves. If we take away the numbing comfort and security of our professional reason for being, we are faced with the disconcerting uncertainties of our responsibility in being. This is not easy. Yet, perhaps, it is only when we are pulled in every direction with doubt, conviction, pain and joy, that we are able to share in the emancipatory wisdom of humanity that has been the lived life of generations before us and of generations to come. Life then ceases to be a problem to be solved. Rather it reveals itself as a journey to be traveled, and travailed. In all wonder, I take my first tentative steps. And the directions for these steps must always be the subject of personal and collective judgment, nurtured through conversation rather than orders, relationships rather than orderings, in located worlds rather than in the abstracted "world," in living rather than in acting.